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Two Years of the First Amendment in the
United States Court of Appeals: The 2007




My mother (and maybe yours) often told me to ignore nasty things
that may be said by others. She used this adage: "Sticks and stones may
break your bones, but names will never hurt you." While well meaning,
the advice was bad as a matter of fact and (although I did not know it
then) as a matter of law. One can recover from physical cuts and bruises,
but the psychological and emotional damage that words inflict are much
longer lasting, and the retribution that may be visited on a speaker can
be harsh.
From school-yard bullies to college peers and professors; from par-
ents, siblings, and relatives to employers and co-workers; from prisoners
and their custodians, what people say to or about one another can give
rise to legal actions of various stripes. But for First Amendment pur-
poses, there must be governmental action. So when my children com-
plained of my efforts to censor their speech or punish them for bad
language, I explained to them the difference between state actions and
private (Dad) actions, and why that difference allowed me to do what a
governmental action might not be able to do: impose sanctions based
upon what was said.
When I canvassed two years of the First Amendment decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, I was sur-
prised to see that the vast majority of the First Amendment cases were
not religious freedom cases or classic protest cases: They were retalia-
tion cases-government institutions allegedly taking action against indi-
viduals for what they said. Fifty-two of the 116 Eleventh Circuit cases
retrieved by a Westlaw query covering January 2007 through mid-Janu-
ary 2009 involved those kinds of claims. Educational officials and city
and county governments or their officials were accused of firing or
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demoting employees because of what they said. Prisoners complained of
retribution by jail or prison employees because of complaints made
regarding jail conditions.
To me, this marked an interesting development: Approximately
forty-five percent of the 2007-2008 First Amendment cases evolved
from losing one's employment or privileges because of what one says. I
was not unaware of the First Amendment principles condemning gov-
ernmental retribution for protected speech, but the fact that such cases
had become a near majority of the Eleventh Circuit's First Amendment
docket was unexpected.
The days of sticks and stones being wielded against those invoking
their right to speak or demonstrate on broad policy matters have now
been replaced by more individual disputes. The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, born of the old Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and its his-
toric protection of civil rights against institutional southern racism, well-
chronicled in Jack Bass's Unlikely Heroes,' has become a court con-
fronted with more personal First Amendment cases. They are no less
important, especially in an economic and political time when good and
honest government is essential to the nation's well being, and job secur-
ity and fair treatment of prisoners is on the minds of many citizens.
Against that backdrop, I turn to what I found and what it means, at least
to me. By focusing on this genre of cases, one learns a little about the
law and a lot about the life of those who labor or are confined in govern-
mental entities.
I. THE DATA
The Eleventh Circuit's appellate jurisdiction covers Florida, Geor-
gia, and Alabama. Here is a macro picture of the fifty-two retaliation
cases from those states.
A. Florida
Ten of the twenty-three retaliation cases involved correctional offi-
cials.' Six of the retaliation cases were against municipal governments.
The City of Miami was a defendant in two of the cases; the City of
1. JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
2. See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (11 th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Villapando, 286
F. App'x 682, 683 (11 th Cir. 2008); Robinson v. Boyd, 276 F. App'x 909, 909-10 (11 th Cir.
2008); Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 07-13752, 2008 WL 781824, at *1 (11 th Cir. Mar. 25,
2008) (per curiam); Frazier v. McDonough, 264 F. App'x 812, 814 (11th Cir. 2008); Rowan v.
Harris, No. 07-11620, 2008 WL 54877, at *1 (1 I th Cir. Jan. 4, 2008) (per curiam); Smith v. Sec'y
for the Dep't of Corr., 252 F. App'x 301, 302 (11th Cir. 2007); Hasemeier v. Shepard, 252 F.
App'x 282, 283-84 (11 th Cir. 2007); Brown v. Mache, 233 F. App'x 940, 941 (11 th Cir. 2007);
Pittman v. Tucker, 213 F. App'x 867, 868 (11 th Cir. 2007).
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Miami Beach, the City of Lake Worth, the City of Coral Springs, and
Islamorada, Village of Islands, were each named in the four other
municipal government cases.' On the educational front, three school
boards (Osceola County, Polk County, and Palm Beach County) were
defendants, as were two post-secondary institutions: Florida Interna-
tional University and Miami-Dade Community College.4 One action
involved county officials-the Collier County Commission'-and
another was a suit against the State Attorney for Miami-Dade County.6
B. Georgia
Eight correctional-officer cases led the parade in Georgia.7 Four
counties or their county officials were defendants (Fulton, Henry, Chat-
ham, and Augusta-Richmond),8 as was one county office of a state
agency.9 Three school boards (Forsyth, Richmond, and Putnam County
boards)' and two post-secondary institutions and their officers (Georgia
University System Board of Regents and Savannah State University)
were also sued." The City of Atlanta and the City of Dawsonville were
the two municipal governments that were named as defendants in retali-
ation cases.' 2 Eight prisoner retaliation cases rounded out the Georgia
3. See Brillinger v. City of Lake Worth, No. 08-10020, 2008 WL 3864383, at *1 (11 th Cir.
Aug. 21, 2008) (per curiam); Bates v. Islamorada, 243 F. App'x 494, 495 (11 th Cir. 2007); DA
Mortgage, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11 th Cir. 2007); Rodin v. City of
Coral Springs, 229 F. App'x 849, 851 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
4. See Meredith v. Sch. Bd., 260 F. App'x 214, 214 (11th Cir. 2007); D'Angelo v. Sch. Bd.,
497 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007); Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir.
2007); Sherrod v. Palm Beach County Sch. Dist., 237 F. App'x 423, 424 (1 1th Cir. 2007); Vila v.
Padr6n, 484 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2007).
5. See Thampi v. Collier County Bd. of Comm'rs, 273 F. App'x 836, 836 (1 1th Cir. 2008).
6. See Khan v. Femandez-Rundle, 287 F. App'x 50, 50 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
7. See Shaw v. Cowart, No. 07-14884, 2008 WL 4888479, at *1 (11 th Cir. Nov. 13, 2008)
(per curiam); Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1080 (1 1th Cir. 2008); Hicks v. Ferrero (Hicks
I/), 285 F. App'x 585, 586 (1 1th Cir. 2008); Martinez v. Minnis, 257 F. App'x 261, 262-63 (1 1th
Cir. 2007); Dickerson v. Donald, 252 F. App'x 277, 279 (11 th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Nix, 240 F.
App'x 830, 832 (11th Cir. 2007); Hicks v. Ferrero, 241 F. App'x 595, 596-97 (11th Cir. 2007);
Thomas v. Warner, 237 F. App'x 435, 436 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
8. See Bennett v. Chatham County Sheriff Dep't, No. 08-12083, 2008 WL 4787139, at *1
(11 th Cir. Nov. 4, 2008) (per curiam); Schuster v. Henry County, 281 F. App'x 868, 869 (11 th
Cir. 2008); Akins v. Fulton County, 278 F. App'x 964, 965 (11th Cir. 2008); Collier v. Bd. of Tax
Assessors, 244 F. App'x 265, 267 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
9. See Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1340 & n.9 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
10. See Wilbourne v. Forsyth County Sch. Dist., No. 08-12094, 2009 WL 19345, at *1 (11 th
Cir. Jan. 5, 2009) (per curiam); Myles v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. App'x 898, 899
(11 th Cir. 2008); Dennis v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 260 F. App'x 171, 173 (11 th Cir. 2007).
11. See Stokes v. Savannah State Univ., 291 F. App'x 931, 932 (11th Cir. 2008); Abreu-
Velez v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 248 F. App'x 116, 117 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
12. See Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1273 (1 1th Cir. 2008) (Altonaga, J.); Phillips
v. City of Dawsonville, 499 F.3d 1239, 1240 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
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picture. 13
C. Alabama
There were only two correctional-facility cases in the Alabama
four-case retaliation group. 4 Only one city was sued: Phenix City, Ala-
bama. 5 And Auburn University at Montgomery was the only educa-
tional institution accused of retaliating for the exercise of free-speech
rights. 16
One caveat accompanies the data: Many of the cases included other
allegations of governmental misconduct like race, sex, or disability dis-
crimination. But all of the cases included speech-retaliation claims. So,
either as a primary claim or as an alternative to another claim, each of
the plaintiffs in these cases assented that he or she was punished in some
way for something that each had said.
III. THE LAW ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETALIATION
The fountainhead for speech-retaliation claims against public offi-
cials is the 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education, which
made it clear that an employer could not fire a public employee because
the employee exercised his or her right to freedom of speech. 7 But the
right to be free from retaliation was subject to a balancing test: The
employee had to be speaking as a citizen about a matter of "public con-
cern," and that had to be balanced against the interests of the employer
"in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees."1 8 The Supreme Court explained in Connick v. Myers that
speaking "not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as
an employee upon matters only of personal interest" did not qualify for
protection under Pickering.'9
From those cases evolved a threshold test: Was the employee's
speech on a matter of public concern? That is, was the employee speak-
ing "primarily in the employee's role as citizen, or primarily in the role
13. See Shaw v. Cowart, No. 07-14884, 2008 WL 4888479, at *1 (11 th Cir. Nov. 13, 2008)
(per curiam); Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1080 (1 1th Cir. 2008); Hicks v. Ferrero (Hicks
11), 285 F. App'x 585, 586 (1 th Cir. 2008); Martinez v. Minnis, 257 F. App'x 261, 262-63 (1 1th
Cir. 2007); Dickerson v. Donald, 252 F. App'x 277, 279 (11 th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Nix, 240 F.
App'x 830, 832 (11 th Cir. 2007); Hicks v. Ferrero, 241 F. App'x 595, 596-97 (11 th Cir. 2007);
Thomas v. Warner, 237 F. App'x 435, 436 (11 th Cir. 2007).
14. See Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1271-72 (1 1th Cir. 2008); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F.
App'x 928, 928 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
15. See Davis v. Phenix City, 296 F. App'x 759, 760 (11 th Cir. 2008).
16. See Shortz v. Auburn Univ. at Montgomery, 274 F. App'x 859, 859 (11 th Cir. 2008).
17. 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
18. Id. at 568.
19. 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
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of employee"? 20 The 2006 Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v. Cebal-
los emphasized that the initial Pickering/Connick inquiry required a
court to focus on the citizen/employee issue and held that Ceballos, a
Los Angeles deputy district attorney, was speaking as an employee
when he wrote a memorandum critical of an investigation and recom-
mended dismissal of a case. 2' The Court stated, "[W]hen public employ-
ees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Consti-
tution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline. 22
That Supreme Court's compelled adjustment-the threshold
emphasis of citizen or employee-was acknowledged by the Eleventh
Circuit in Battle v. Board of Regents,2 3 and its effect on the court's pub-
lic employee cases has been devastating to plaintiffs. Because so many
of the Eleventh Circuit's cases in this area are from Florida, I use the
Florida collection to demonstrate the problem for plaintiffs.
IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ARE HARD PRESSED Now TO
WIN A RETALIATION CASE
The Garcetti holding that "[riestricting speech that owes its exis-
tence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citi-
zen"24 has been the death knell for a legion of Eleventh Circuit plain-
tiffs. A Florida assistant state attorney who allegedly refused his
superiors' command to lie to a judge and was fired lost because his
truthful "in-court statements 'owe[d] [their] existence' to his role as a
government lawyer, '25 and therefore he "was not speaking as a citizen
but as an assistant state attorney" and was "not entitled to protection
under the First Amendment."
26
A Collier County employee complained that he was fired for "criti-
cizing waste and gross mismanagement of public funds, resources and
projects in Collier County," and, because the speech "pertained to offi-
cial job-related matters," there was no First Amendment claim. 27 The
School Board of Polk County did not violate a fired principal's First
20. Morris v. Crow, 142 F.3d 1379, 1382 (1lth Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citing Morgan v.
Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (lth Cir. 1993)).
21. 547 U.S. 410, 413, 421 (2006).
22. Id. at 421.
23. 468 F.3d 755 (11th Cir. 2006).
24. 547 U.S. at 421-22.
25. Khan v. Femandez-Rundle, 287 F. App'x 50, 52 (11 th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original).
26. Id.
27. Thampi v. Collier County Bd. of Comm'rs, 273 F. App'x 836, 836 (11 th Cir. 2008).
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Amendment rights because his "efforts to convert Kathleen High to
charter status [were not undertaken] as a citizen."" 8 An Osceola County
teacher's contract was not renewed, but her "speech was not protected
speech because her speech did not involve a matter of public concern but
constituted mere gossip or rumors" emanating from a discussion with
another elementary school teacher.29
A Miami-Dade Community College vice president's criticism of
illegal or unethical conduct by the College president and other officials
did not prevent the nonrenewal of her contract because "all of her com-
munications related to the College and were under her jurisdiction and
authority as the Vice President of External Affairs .... These statements
fall squarely within her official job duties and are not protected by the
First Amendment."3 Thus, the majority of these cases are lost on the
first leg of the inquiry-employees complaining about matters in their
workplace.
But there are ways to thread the private/public concern needle. A
ten-year voluntary firefighter, displeased with the plan of the City of
Coral Springs to have the fire department staffed by both paid and vol-
unteer firefighters, met with city officials to discuss his concerns and
was terminated as a volunteer fireman. 3' He spoke on behalf of the Coral
Springs Volunteer Firefighters Association and communicated with the
Coral Springs City Fire Chief, City Manager, and the City Commis-
sion.3 2 The court of appeals reversed the trial-court summary judgment
that had been entered against the firefighter.
Rodin also advised the public officials that fire trucks and air
hoses used by volunteer firefighters had allegedly been vandalized.
We have held that allegations of misconduct in the provision of emer-
gency services are a matter of public concern. Rodin's comments in
this regard were directly relevant both to the safety of the firefighters
and to their ability to provide effective fire services.
Rodin's comments about funding and training in the fire depart-
ment were also matters of public concern. He criticized expenditures
on badges, a car for Haupt, and out-of-state firefighters as wasteful.
We have previously held criticism of a public institution's funding
decisions to be on a matter of public concern. Rodin also claimed at
the March 13 meeting that volunteer firefighters were not receiving
enough training. Whether firefighters are receiving adequate training
28. D'Angelo v. Sch. Bd., 497 F.3d 1203, 1210 (11 th Cir. 2007).
29. Meredith v. Sch. Bd., 260 F. App'x 214, 214 (11 th Cir. 2007).
30. Vila v. Padr6n, 484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (1 lth Cir. 2007) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006)).
31. Rodin v. City of Coral Springs, 229 F. App'x 849, 850-51 (11 th Cir. 2007).
32. Id.
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is also clearly a matter of public concern. 33
The court recognized that some of Rodin's comments "were argua-
bly relevant only to the private interests of the volunteer firefighters,"
but that did not preclude a First Amendment claim because Connick
made clear that public and private concerns can still qualify for protec-
tion. 34 The Rodin court looked to the fact that there was a "then-current
public debate," that Rodin was speaking as a representative of an organi-
zation of volunteer firefighters,35 that he would not personally benefit
from any of the proposals that he made, and that his statements "were
motivated in significant part by the public interest: specifically, a desire
to improve the fire department. '"36
In Rodin, the court emphasized the importance of "context" (the
circumstances leading to the speech) and the type of dissemination (pub-
lic or private) utilized by the speaker to convey his or her speech. Public
dissemination, or the lack of it, can be significant, but the court recog-
nized that "the fact that a statement of public concern is made in private
can actually support the employee speaker."37
Because the public concern/private interest assessment is the
threshold that must be crossed before a court assesses the remaining
Pickering-driven factors-whether the First Amendment speech interest
outweighs the employer's interest in prohibiting the speech to promote
efficiency, whether the speech played a substantial part in the decision to
take adverse employment action against the employee, and whether the
employer "would have reached the same decision .. . even in the
absence of the protected conduct" 8-it is the critical area of inquiry.
The other factors are intensely factual, but the public concern/private
interest determination turns on how the employee presents and handles
the grievance or complaint that results in the adverse employment
action.
Looking at the retaliation cases over the past two years reveals sev-
eral themes. First, given the enormous number of public employees, the
number of First Amendment retaliation complaints is relatively low.
Second, the Florida cases seem to be bunched in South Florida. Whether
that is because public employees in South Florida are more aggressively
outspoken or litigious or whether their governmental employers are thin-
ner skinned and less willing to endure criticism, is anyone's guess. But it
33. Id. at 853 (citations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 854.
36. Id. at 855.
37. Id. at 856 n.6 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)).
38. Anderson v. Burke County, 239 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11 th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (alteration
in original).
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is clear that the major hurdle for public employees is avoiding the
Garcetti syndrome, and the most effective defense for pubic employers
is casting the employee's complaints into the private, not public, concern
category. Since the vast majority of complaints and criticisms will arise
within the context of the employee's job, the First Amendment edge
goes to the employers. The court has not been off base in its review of
these public-employee cases, and its decisions reflect the reality of the
public-employer workplace, where employees' complaints are triggered
by personal disputes, not matters of public concern.
But, as I show below, the First Amendment retaliation cause of
action has more vitality for prisoners than employees.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT LAW ON PRISONER RETALIATION
Punishing a prisoner for filing a grievance concerning the condi-
tions of his or her confinement violates the First Amendment.39 The
choreography for a prisoner retaliation claim is this:
An inmate raises a constitutional claim of retaliation if he establishes
that the prison disciplined him for filing a grievance or lawsuit con-
cerning the conditions of his imprisonment. To establish a claim for
retaliation, the inmate must show a causal connection between his
protected conduct and the harm complained of.4"
Put another way, the court has explained that the prisoner must
establish that "his speech ... was constitutionally protected; ... that the
defendant's retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech;
and ... that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions
and the adverse effect on speech."'"
The Eleventh Circuit has been sensitive to prisoner retaliation
claims. Most of them are brought by the prisoner acting pro se. Despite
that, the prisoner cases have a high rate of success on appeal: Six of the
ten reported Florida cases resulted in at least partial reversals.42 It's
unlikely that another category of appellate cases carries a sixty percent
chance of reversal. The Georgia prisoner-retaliation cases carry a lower
39. See, e.g., Rowan v. Harris, No. 07-11620, 2008 WL 54877, at *1 (11 th Cir. Jan. 4, 2008)
(per curiam).
40. Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 07-13752, 2008 WL 781824, at *2 (1 1th Cir. Mar. 25,
2008) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
41. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11 th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bennett v. Hendrix, 423
F.3d 1247, 1250 (11 th Cir. 2005)).
42. See id. at 1322; Smith v. Villapando, 286 F. App'x 682, 686 (11 th Cir. 2008); Fla. Dep't
of Corr., 2008 WL 781824, at *4; Frazier v. McDonough, 264 F. App'x 812, 815-16 (11 th Cir.
2008); Hasemeier v. Shepard, 252 F. App'x 282, 286 (1 1th Cir. 2007); Pittman v. Tucker, 213 F.
App'x 867, 872 (11 th Cir. 2007).
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reversal rate-three of eight-but that too is likely a higher rate of
reversal than the general appellate figure.
The prisoner cases start out on a much smaller field because the
relationship between jailer and prisoner is very limited. Therefore the
prisoner complaints are about conditions and the alleged retribution in
the change in confinement conditions that follow a complaint. The pris-
oners' stories in these cases make it easier for the court to respond
because the facts fall into a much narrower pattern.
VI. THE PRISONER CASES
Two of the three successful Georgia prison-retaliation cases were
won by pro se inmates. Danny Hicks defeated prison officials' interlocu-
tory appeal from the district court's denial of their qualified-immunity
summary-judgment motion, with the court finding that raising Hicks's
security level after he filed prison-condition grievances would violate
clearly established law.43 The striking facts-that Hicks had been at a
minimum security level for twenty-seven years, that he had a thirteen-
year "clean record," and that all the factors used post-grievance to raise
his security level had already been factored into his annual minimum-
security reviews-convinced the court that a reasonable prison official
"should have realized at the time that he made the retaliatory decision
that he was violating a clearly established constitutional right."44
Dexter Shaw convinced the court to reverse a summary judgment
when the court found that he "creat[ed] a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether [his jailer] wrote [a] disciplinary report . . . and closed
Shaw in his cell door in retaliation for Shaw writing a grievance and
letters to prison officials about her."45 And a case that involved whether
a prison administrative remedy for a non-First Amendment claim had
been pursued resulted in a major First Amendment holding "that a
prison official's serious threats of substantial retaliation against an
inmate for lodging or pursuing in good faith a grievance make the
administrative remedy 'unavailable,' and thus lift the exhaustion
requirement."46 The importance of the decision, and its as yet undefined
contours, is apparent from the court's holding that the inmate must show
that "the threat is one that would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary
firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance."47 The court then con-
43. Hicks v. Ferrero, 241 F. App'x 595, 598 (11th Cir. 2007).
44. Id.
45. Shaw v. Cowart, No. 07-14884, 2008 WL 4888479, at *5 (11 th Cir. Nov. 13, 2008) (per
curiam).
46. Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2008).
47. Id.
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cluded that "[t]he particulars of this standard for determining the availa-
bility of administrative remedies where a threat is alleged can be honed
against the facts of future cases, with particular attention paid to the
special circumstances and security needs of prisons. 48 That invitation
will, I am sure, open the door to new cases trying to fit into the presently
undefined standard.
On the Florida front, a pro se prisoner gained a reversal of a district
court's sua sponte dismissals of his retaliation complaints,49 and another
pro se prisoner gained another reversal of a district court judge's sua
sponte dismissal of his retaliation complaint.5 °
A third pro se litigant-a pre-trial detainee-convinced the court to
reverse a summary judgment against him where his "excessive force
claims ... [were] intertwined with the retaliation claim."5 In two other
Florida cases, prisoners represented by out-of-state lawyers were suc-
cessful in reversing a dismissed retaliation claim and an adverse sum-
mary judgment on a retaliation claim.52
It is interesting to note that all of the Florida/Georgia reversals,
except for Douglas v. Yates,53 were on the court's non-argument calen-
dar. That is not surprising given the pro se cases, but it is an interesting
insight into the diligence and care that the court gives to the prisoner
cases. Argued or not, the court is vigilant as to First Amendment claims
by prisoners.
Neither of the two Alabama cases was on the non-argument calen-
dar, nor were they pro se, and in both cases the prisoners lost.54 Indeed,
the two pubic employee retaliation cases from Alabama were also




Among the balance of the non-retaliation First Amendment cases
were a few of special interest. None made new law, but the cases I dis-
48. Id.
49. Smith v. Villapando, 286 F. App'x 682, 685-86 (11 th Cir. 2008).
50. Frazier v. McDonough, 264 F. App'x 812, 815 (11 th Cir. 2008).
51. Hasemeier v. Shepard, 252 F. App'x 282, 285 (11 th Cir. 2007).
52. See Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (1 lth Cir. 2008); Pittman v. Tucker, 213
F. App'x 867, 870-72 (11 th Cir. 2007).
53. 535 F.3d 1316.
54. See Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1279 (lth Cir. 2008); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F.
App'x 928, 929 (11 th Cir. 2007).
55. Davis v. Phenix City, 296 F. App'x 759, 761 (11 th Cir. 2008); Shortz v. Auburn Univ. at
Montgomery, 274 F. App'x 859, 861 (11th Cir. 2008).
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cuss below caught my attention because they reflect some interesting by-
products of the First Amendment as seen by people offended by govern-
mental action.
Years ago, when student protest was at its zenith, the Supreme
Court opened the door to protecting student speech in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, which held that wear-
ing black armbands to protest the Vietnam war could not be punished by
high-school authorities.56 Tinker spawned a host of student-speech cases
over the years that sought to take symbolic speech to non-political
realms like choice of clothing or, in Bar-Navon v. Brevard County
School Board, the right to wear "non-otic body piercings at school."57
Danielle Bar-Navon had piercings on "her tongue, nasal septum, lip,
navel and chest" that, according to her, was a way of "expressing her
non-conformity and wild side, an expression of her openness to new
ideas and her readiness to take on challenges in life."
58
The district court assumed that the jewelry wearing was protected
by the First Amendment, but the Court of Appeals had doubts. "We
question that the prohibition of jewelry in non-otic piercings on students
at school who seek to make some general statement of individuality
implicates First Amendment speech protections. '59 But, even assuming
some protected interest, the court concluded that "[t]he incidental
restriction the non-otic pierced jewelry regulation impose[d] on expres-
sive conduct [was] viewpoint and content-neutral on its face and as
applied" and within the school board's "legitimate educational
objectives."60
The court's rejection of Bar-Navon's "expressive" conduct comes
as no surprise in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in the
Alaska "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" case.61 Joseph Frederick unfurled a
banner with that saying while watching the Olympic Torch Relay pass
outside the school, a viewing sanctioned by the school. 62 He was sus-
pended, sued, lost in the district court, won in the Ninth Circuit, and lost
in the Supreme Court. The case generated five opinions, with the major-
ity holding:
[S]chools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care
56. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
57. 290 F. App'x 273, 275 (1 1th Cir. 2008). The term "otic" relates to the ear; conversely, the
term "non-otic" refers here to jewelry not worn on the ear. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 879 (11 th ed. 2003).
58. Bar-Navon, 290 F. App'x at 275.
59. Id. at 276 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08).
60. Id. at 277.
61. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
62. Id. at 2622.
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from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal
drug use. We conclude that the school officials in this case did not
violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and
suspending the student responsible for it.
63
Justice Stevens, with Justices Souter and Ginsburg joining, felt the
majority had too cramped a view of the facts and the law. Justice Ste-
vens wrote:
I would hold, however, that the school's interest in protecting its stu-
dents from exposure to speech 'reasonably regarded as promoting
illegal drug use,' cannot justify disciplining Frederick for his attempt
to make an ambiguous statement to a television audience simply
because it contained an oblique reference to drugs. The First Amend-
ment demands more, indeed, much more.
In my judgment, the First Amendment protects student speech if
the message itself neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly
advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to students. This non-
sense banner does neither . . .6
"Nonsense" catches my attention because, in a world rife with hun-
ger, poverty, pessimism, and misery, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" and "non-
otic body piercings" do not seem worthy of so much attention and judi-
cial effort. However, more serious use of judicial labor can be found in
Frazier v. Winn,65 a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Florida
Pledge Statute.66
The court addressed two First Amendment problems: whether
requiring "civilians" to stand at attention was valid and whether requir-
ing a written parental request to be excused was facially constitutional.
The court struck the "standing at attention" requirement because it
is clearly established "[t]hat students have a constitutional right to
remain seated during the Pledge."'67 However, the court found that the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2643-44 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
65. 535 F.3d 1279 (1 1th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, No. 06-14462, 2009 WL 166980
(11 th Cir. Jan. 26, 2009).
66. The Florida Pledge Statute provided:
The pledge of allegiance to the flag . . . shall be rendered by students .... The
pledge of allegiance to the flag shall be recited at the beginning of the day in each
public elementary, middle, and high school in the state. Each student shall be
informed by posting a notice in a conspicuous place that the student has the right
not to participate in reciting the pledge. Upon written request by his or her parent,
the student must be excused from reciting the pledge. When the pledge is given,
civilians must show full respect to the flag by standing at attention, men removing
the headdress, except when such headdress is worn for religious purposes ....
FLA. STAT. § 1003.44(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
67. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1282.
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parental-consent requirement was not facially overbroad, pointing to the
Supreme Court's requirement that an overbreadth challenge requires
caution.68 The court cited the Supreme Court's language in the seminal
flag-salute-and-pledge case, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, in which the Court wrote, "[F]reedoms of speech ... [is] sus-
ceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the State may lawfully protect."69
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Barnette's prohibition on gov-
ernment compelling students to participate in the pledge but also recog-
nized "that a parent's right to interfere with the wishes of his child is
stronger than a public school official's right to interfere on behalf of the
school's own interest."70 The court relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Wisconsin v. Yoder 7 -another major school case that allowed
Amish parents to escape compulsory school attendance on free-exercise
grounds-to support its position that "parents .. .hav[e] the principal
role in guiding how their children will be educated on civic values."72
With that, the court declined to deliver an overbreadth striking of the
parental-consent portion of the Pledge Statute, concluding "that the
State's interest in recognizing and protecting the rights of parents on
some educational issues is sufficient to justify the restriction of some
students' freedom of speech."73 The court did leave the door open to an
"as applied to a specific student or a specific division of students" chal-
lenge,74 an invitation to a suit brought by high-school students, rather
than the broad brush action in Winn, which challenged the use of the
statute across all grade levels, "kindergarten to twelfth grade."7"
Rehearing en banc was denied to Winn in Frazier v. Alexandre.76
Judge Barkett dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc with strong
language, saying that the panel decision "directly contravenes precedent
that has been firmly entrenched for over 65 years, since West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette" and that the panel's characteriza-
tion of conflicting parent/children constitutional rights is "wholly unper-
suasive."" She wrote, "[T]he statute forces students whose parents are
in agreement with their desires to still seek parental permission to exer-
68. Id. at 1285.
69. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
70. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1285.
71. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
72. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1285.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1286.
75. Id. at 1281.
76. No. 06-14462, 2009 WL 166980, at *1 (11th Cir. Jan. 26, 2009).
77. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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cise a right that Barnette has already established they have."78
School rules also were in play in Boim v. Fulton County School
District.79 There, citing a "climate of increasing school violence,"8 the
Eleventh Circuit found no First Amendment problem with disciplining a
student who wrote in her notebook of "taking a gun to her sixth period
classroom and shooting her teacher in front of other students" and then
giving the notebook to another student8 : "Rachel created an appreciable
risk of disrupting [Roswell High School] in a way that, regrettably is not
a matter of mere speculation or paranoia."82
Thus, the school-board cases reflect an interesting mix of individual
idiosyncratic claims of First Amendment violations and more classic
concerns. The decisions reflect sensitive and thoughtful analyses and
deference to concerns of school officials, but it is interesting to compare
Justice Thomas's anti-Tinker tirade in Morse v. Frederick83 with Justice
Stevens's dissent in that case to glean an insight into the competing
values.
Justice Thomas wrote, "In light of the history of American public
education, it cannot seriously be suggested that the First Amendment
'freedom of speech' encompasses a student's right to speak in public
schools. Early public schools gave total control to teachers, who
expected obedience and respect from students."84 Meanwhile, Justice
Stevens wrote, "[T]he Court's ham-handed, categorical approach is deaf
to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among
high-school students."85 No doubt Judge Barkett would be in the Justice
Stevens camp, given her dissent in Alexandre.
It is apparent that there is a great space in the middle of these two
viewpoints that will be filled by appellate-court decisions relating to stu-
dent/school board disputes. But a question that remains for me is where
are the parents in these cases? Body piercings at school or dream
sequences of school murder incorporated into a school notebook deserve
parental sanctions, not parental support for First Amendment litigation.
Nevertheless, the good news is that the instances are rare, and the fact
that so few of these cases have appeared in the Eleventh Circuit in the
past two years reflects, I think, that schools, students, and the First
Amendment are generally at peace.
78. Id. at *5 n.ll.
79. 494 F.3d 978 (11 th Cir. 2007).
80. Id. at 984.
81. Id. at 983.
82. Id. at 985.
83. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
84. Id. at 2635-36.
85. Id. at 2649.
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B. Fools
Gerardo Tapanes led the Coast Guard on a twenty-three-nautical-
mile chase, and the fact that he "signaled an obscene hand gesture (his
middle finger)" was considered by the district court in sentencing him to
sixty months.86 On appeal, he asserted (for the first time) a First Amend-
ment argument, but the court held that "[t]he district court did not
plainly err by considering Tapanes's obscene gesture during the sentenc-
ing phase."87 So, while "giving the finger" may be a form of expres-
sion,88 it is neither smart, nor constitutionally off limits in the context of
criminal sentencing.
The court rightly affirmed Tapanes's sentence.
C. Rules
In Pelphrey v. Cobb County, county taxpayers sued officials of two
county commissions who allowed "volunteer leaders of different reli-
gions, on a rotating basis, to offer invocations with a variety of religious
expressions."89 The prayers were led by a cross-section of clergy-
Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Unitarian, Universalism-and included refer-
ences to Jesus, Allah, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and Moham-
med, but the plaintiffs argued "that the Establishment Clause permits
only nonsectarian prayers for the meetings of the commissions."9 °
The difficulty of drawing a sectarian/nonsectarian line stemmed
from competing views of Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Supreme
Court wrote, "The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges
where . . . there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been
exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other,
faith or belief." 91 The taxpayers read Marsh as allowing only nonsec-
tarian prayers, but the Eleventh Circuit panel disagreed, pointing to
Marsh's admonition against parsing "the content of a particular
prayer." 92 The panel was puzzled by the taxpayers' effort to define the
divine/non-divine:
We would not know where to begin to demarcate the boundary
between sectarian and nonsectarian expressions, and the taxpayers
86. United States v. Tapanes, 284 F. App'x 617, 618 (11th Cir. 2008).
87. Id. at 620.
88. The Romans favored the gesture, calling it digitus impudicus, and Rahm Emanuel,
President Obama's Chief of Staff, who cut off his middle finger while working at Arby's, has said
this: "Of all the fingers to lose! I could not express myself for months." Karmic Knowledge, http:/
/karmicknowledge.com (Nov. 8, 2008).
89. 547 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2008).
90. Id.
91. 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
92. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1272 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795).
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have been opaque in explaining that standard. Even the individual
taxpayers cannot agree on which expressions are "sectarian." Bats,
one of the taxpayers, testified that prohibition of "sectarian" refer-
ences would preclude the use of "father," "Allah," and "Zoraster" but
would allow "God" and "Jehovah." Selman, another taxpayer, testi-
fied, "[Y]ou can't say Jesus, ... Jehovah, . . . [or] Wicca ....
Selman also deemed "lord or father" impermissible.
The taxpayers' counsel fared no better than his clients in provid-
ing a consistent and workable definition of sectarian expressions. In
the district court, counsel for the taxpayers deemed "Heavenly
Father" and "Lord" nonsectarian, even though his clients testified to
the contrary. At the hearing for oral arguments before this Court, the
taxpayers' counsel asserted two standards to determine when refer-
ences are impermissibly "sectarian." Counsel for the taxpayers first
stated, "It is sectarian when the.., prayer has the effect of affiliating
the government with one specific faith or belief," but he later
described a reference as "sectarian" when it "invokes the name of a
divinity.., in which only one faith believes." Counsel had difficulty
applying either standard to various religious expressions. When
asked, for example, whether "King of kings" was sectarian, he
replied, "King of kings may be a tough one . . . . It is arguably a
reference to one God .... I think it is safe to conclude that it might
not be sectarian."9 3
So the panel "decline[d] this role of 'ecclesiastical arbiter,"' quoting
from Justice Brennan's dissent in Marsh.94 But among all the First
Amendment decisions in the past two years, that declination triggered
the most spirited dissent; a dissent that dissected Marsh, calling it an
"outlier" and cautioned against using that decision "to sanction more
state-sponsored prayers."95 The dissent focused on the Lemon v. Kurtz-
man96 Establishment Clause test-a secular purpose, neither advancing
nor inhibiting religion, with no "excessive government entangle-
ment"9 7-and the fact that the commissioners' invocations of "divine
guidance" was for a religious purpose, advancing religion, as well as the
fact that inviting religious leaders entangled the commissions with relig-
ion.98 Viewing Marsh, which upheld the Nebraska Legislature's practice
of an opening prayer by a state-employed chaplain, as limited to the
93. Id. (alterations in original).
94. Id. at 1274 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The use of the
Brennan quote is a bit ornery, because Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's decision to
allow the Nebraska Legislature to lead off its sessions with a prayer.
95. Id. at 1286 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting).
96. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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historical acceptance of the practice in the United States Congress and
state legislatures, Judge Middlebrooks noted that, "[i]n the more than 15
years since the Lee [v. Weisman] decision, neither the Supreme Court
nor this Court has expanded the Marsh exception to include other gov-
ernment prayers."99 He warned:
On this matter of first impression, the majority has expanded the
Marsh exception to allow prayer at the Cobb County Planning Com-
mission and the Cobb County Commission. This expansion will
allow a chorus of government prayers to resound from every "delib-
erative body" of every locality whose duty it is to address the secular
affairs of its constituents. °°
Judge Middlebrooks's references to the established law mandating
"'neutrality between ... religion and nonreligion"' 10' was prescient. In
President Obama's Inauguration Speech, he included "nonbelievers" in
his list of religions. 1o2 That unprecedented acknowledgment of the right
to not believe echoes, in a way, Judge Middlebrooks's Establishment
Clause concerns that government and religion should not be mixed:
Adoption of the Establishment Clause was a break from ecclesiastic
rule, and the commencement of the separate spheres of religion and
government so as to preserve the integrity of both. The hazards that
result from ecclesiastic rule, both for religion and for government,
were perceived by the drafters. Those hazards can be observed today
in places where the distinctions between religious and secular laws
are blurred, where dissent is not tolerated, and where faith becomes a
weapon to be wielded by those who seek power. In this country,
pious politicians who compete for support through public professions
of their own rectitude and devotion take a step toward those hazards,
and religion becomes less meaningful through the hollow prayers
spoken with the dual purpose of seeking a divine audience and
appealing to a secular one.
0 3
Of course, one could say that the repeated references to God
throughout the inaugural process belies the notion that the separation of
God and State is as constitutionally recognized as Judge Middlebrooks
believes, but his dissent is a very provocative piece.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit is a wonderful court. It struggles with a vari-
99. Id. at 1285; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (disallowing nonsectarian
prayer at public school graduation).
100. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1285 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1289 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
102. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), in 155 CONG. REC. S668-69
(daily ed. Jan. 20, 2009).
103. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1290-91 (Middlebrooks, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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ety of cases and treats them all with respect. If there is a problem in the
First Amendment area, it is that the relevant Supreme Court precedent is
often the product of a fractured Supreme Court, making it difficult to
easily apply that Court's principles. But that struggle is the heart of the
First Amendment decision-making process, and the Eleventh Circuit has
sought to follow the First Amendment as well as any Circuit.
The dissent of Judge Barkett in the denial of rehearing en banc in
the Florida Pledge Statute case, and the dissent of District Judge Mid-
dlebrooks, sitting as a visiting Eleventh Circuit judge, in the Cobb
County prayer case, were delightful attempts to make the court more
receptive to First Amendment protections. The court's nearly unfailing
willingness to protect prisoners from retaliation because they protested
their conditions of confinement, was also a pleasure to see.
Will the court change over the next decade because of Democratic
control of the appointment process? Possibly, but, whatever change
there may be, I guarantee that the court's First Amendment caseload will
present interesting issues for future readers to review.
IX. A POSTSCRIPT
After this article was submitted, the Eleventh Circuit decided
ACLU of Florida, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County School Board, which
reversed a preliminary injunction and held that the Miami-Dade County
School Board could remove the book Vamos a Cuba from the County's
elementary and middle school libraries."° The book, part of a series
providing information about children's lives in other countries, was
removed by the Miami-Dade School Board despite the District Materials
Review Committee's vote to retain the book. 105 The two-to-one panel
opinion surveyed the First Amendment school law, and it acknowledged
and assumed the applicability of the Board of Education v. Pico.1°6
"Under the Pico standard, the Board members violated the First Amend-
ment if they removed Vamos a Cuba 'simply because they dislike[d] the
ideas contained in [the] book[ ]' and sought its removal "'to prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion."' .1
0 7
But Judge Carnes, reviewing the record de novo, disagreed with the
district court's finding of a Pico violative motive for removing the book
and concluded that the Miami-Dade School Board did not remove it for
104. 2009 WL 263122, at *53 (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 2009).
105. Id. at *2-3.
106. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
107. ACLU of Fla., 2009 WL 263122, at *27 (alterations in original) (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at
872 (plurality opinion)).
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political orthodoxy reasons. The panel opinion concluded that the
Miami-Dade School Board was motivated by inaccuracies in the book:
"The consistency throughout the process of the inaccuracy complaints
and the consistency of the explanations of the Board members who
voted to remove the book evidence that the Board's motive was what it
stated-that the book was ordered removed from school libraries
because it is full of factual errors."'
10 8
The Court credited the Board's explanation and devoted a large
section of the opinion to detailing the inaccuracies that had been asserted
by those supporting removal of the book, coming to this conclusion:
"The Board removed from its own school libraries a book that the Board
had purchased for those libraries with Board funds. It did not prohibit
anyone else from owning, possessing, or reading the book."' 0 9 There-
fore, "[t]he overwrought rhetoric about book banning has no place
here."' 10
Judge Wilson, dissenting, disagreed: "The greater weight of the
credible evidence supports the district court's finding 'that the majority
of the Miami-Dade County School Board members intended by their
removal of the book to deny schoolchildren access to ideas or points-of-
view with which the school officials disagreed, and that this intent was
the decisive factor in their removal decision."' "' Judge Wilson carefully
responded to Judge Carnes's majority opinion, deconstructing his analy-
sis of inaccuracies and motivation, and pointing to Cuban Museum of
Arts & Culture, Inc. v. City of Miami. 2 as precedent that reflected the
strong feelings of the Cuban community, leading to censorship."
3
The ACLU of Florida decision is extraordinary in many ways.
Appellate reversal of a preliminary injunction is a rare event. Judge
Carnes extensive use of the reasons given by the Miami-Dade School
Board members in the debate over removing the book is a wonderful
example of how to marshal facts to support a legal argument, and his
opinion vigorously disagrees with Judge Wilson's view that the book
was "banned."' 4 So reading this opinion provides one with an unusual
108. Id. at *34.
109. Id. at 40.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *57 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
112. 766 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Fla. 1991). In Cuban Museum, 766 F. Supp. 1121, the City of
Miami sought to close a museum because the museum had shown art by artists who had not
denounced Fidel Castro.
113. ACLU of Fla., 2009 WL 263122, at *65.
114. Compare id. at *40 (Cares, J.) ("[T]he book was not being banned.... The book could
still be found in public libraries in the area, and it was available for purchase from any of several
online book sellers."), with id. at *61 (Wilson, J., dissenting) ("The record provides palpable
support for the district court's conclusion that School Board members banned that book not
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opportunity to witness a high-level legal discussion over how to inter-
pret and apply the First Amendment in a highly charged debate.
And that last part-the highly charged debate-is the most interest-
ing part of the case for me. Whoever was advising the Miami-Dade
County School Board did a wonderful job in making sure that the public
record comments of the school board members focused on "inaccura-
cies" in the book and not on the anti-Castro fervor that has regularly
colored local governmental decision-making in Miami-Dade County.
The Cuban Museum case was one example. There have been others. The
Miami-Dade County no-business-with-Cuba affidavit was struck down
in Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County."5 An attempt by the city
to charge "security fees" to Cuban musical performers was enjoined and
damages awarded in another case." 6 The list of governmental actions
based on antipathy to anything that smacks of approval of the present
Cuban regime is long. But the Miami-Dade School Board navigated
away from the usual course of events by making a record that allowed
the majority of the panel to make a finding that avoided the Pico pitfall.
Judge Wilson, and United States District Judge Alan Gold, who
found the evidence of political motivation to be overwhelming saw
through the facade. That there were inaccuracies in Vamos a Cuba is
probably true, but every book in every school library has inaccuracies,
especially when the test for inaccuracy can be colored by subjective
views of history, past and present. Thus, if inaccuracy were the test, our
school library bookshelves would likely be barren.
The panel decision is the Vamos a Cuba case was a triumph of law
over truth. The decision reaffirmed what every good lawyer knows:
Facts and law can be mustered to support a result deemed desirable.
Judge Carnes did a masterful job using a record that provided him with
the means to uphold the school board. Judge Wilson did a masterful job
of taking apart that record. Judge Gold did a masterful job of recogniz-
ing the facts of life in Miami-Dade County vis-A-vis Castro's Cuba. The
school board and its counsel did a masterful job in making a record that
provided a means to avoid Pico. Everyone was brilliant. But the First
Amendment was sacrificed on the altar of all that legal brilliance.
Whether one says "banned" or "removed"; whether there were
"inaccuracies" or not; whether one believes in free speech or not; Vamos
a Cuba was a cause c6l bre because, in Miami-Dade County, Cuba
because of inaccuracies per se but because the book failed to make a negative political statement
about contemporary Cuba.").
115. 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (2000).
116. Press Release, ACLU of Fla., City of Miami Refunds Security Fees Charged at 1999 Los
Van Van Concert (Apr. 15, 2004), available at http://www.aclufl.org/news-events/index.cfm?
action=viewRelease&emailAlertlD=7 1.
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touches the heart and minds of the populace in ways that no other coun-
try can match. Inaccuracies in a book about Indonesia would never have
caused the same public furor and would never have led to an Eleventh
Circuit opinion. Rehearing en banc has been sought, and that petition is
pending at the time this article was published." 7
117. A petition for rehearing en banc was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union on
February 25, 2009.
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